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THE PROVINCE OF THE JUDICIARY
WILLIAM E. NELSON*

There is a famous sentence in Marbury v. Madison,' where
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."2 My plan for this Article is to rip Marshall's sentence out of
the context of Marbury and judicial review and to examine it
instead in the context of the turn-of-the-century effort by mainly
Federalist judges to seize from juries the power to find law. I will
suggest that John Marshall played a significant role in that effort.
After doing that, I will return to Marbury and ask more generally
how the judiciary's seizure of lawfinding power from juries might
have been related to the contemporaneously emerging doctrine of
judicial review.
I.

THE LAWFINDING POWER OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY JURIES

In mid-eighteenth-century British North America, juries
determined law as well as fact in the cases that came before them.3
They were free to ignore judges' instructions on the law, for it was
"not only [every juror's] right but his Duty in that Case to find the
Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and
Conscience, tho [sic] in Direct opposition to the Direction of the
Court."4
The jury system was valued precisely because it
introduced into the "executive branch... a mixture of popular
* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law and Professor of History, New York
University. A.B., Hamilton College, 1962; LL.B., New York University, 1965;
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1971. The author is indebted to the members of
the Legal History Colloquium at New York University for their comments and
criticisms and especially to Larry D. Kramer for his help and insights over the
course of the past several years on the issues raised by this paper. The author

also wishes to thank the Filomen D'Agostino Faculty Research Fund of New
York University School of Law for its research support.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Marbury,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
3. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 21-30
(1975) [hereinafter NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW];
William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904-17 (1978)
[hereinafter Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background].
4. 1 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (Kinvin Woods & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965).
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power;" as a result, "the subject ... [was] guarded in the execution
of the laws,"' and "no Man [could] be condemned of Life, or Limb,
or Property or Reputation, without the Concurrence of the Voice of
the People."6 On the eve of the American Revolution, the power of
the jury to control the law was recognized up and down the
Atlantic Coast, from Georgia to New Hampshire, and was
fundamental to the democratic order existing on the western shore
of the Atlantic.7
Faith in juries persisted throughout the Revolutionary era
and emerged with uncommon fervor during the debates on
ratification of the Constitution. Many anti-Federalists expressed
concern that a powerful federal judiciary would infringe on the
power of juries to determine law as well as fact 8-a power that
they continued to regard as essential to the preservation of
"Judges unincumbered [sic] by juries,"" one antiliberty.9
Federalist feared, were "much better friends to government than
to the people." 1 As Richard Henry Lee explained, "in spite of their
own natural integrity," judges possessed "an involuntary bias
towards those of their own rank and dignity."1 2 "[T]he established
right of the jury by the common law, and the fundamental law of
this country,... to decide both as to law and fact," 3 according to
another anti-Federalist, "secure [d] to the people at large, their just
and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial department." 4 Even if
"the freemen of a country [were] not always minutely skilled in
laws," he added, they possessed "common sense in its purity,

5. John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym. No. 3, BOSTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1766, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 477, 481
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
6. 1 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 4, at 229.
7. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16-19 (2000).
8. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 66-68, 87-92 (1999).
9. See id. at 66-68, 87-92.
10. Id. at 87.
11. Id. at 88 (quoting an Old Whig [George Bryan, John Smilie, and James
Hutchinson?], no. 1, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. 12, 1787, in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 19 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981); An Old Whig
[George Bryan, John Smilie, and James Hutchinson?], no. 2, INDEPENDENT
GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra at
24).
12. Id. at 68 (quoting a Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund
Pendelton (May 26, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 878-79 (Merrill Jensen et al., eds.,
1976)).
13. Id. at 91 (quoting Letters from the Federal Farmer[Melancton Smith?],
An Additional Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican..., no. 15 (New York, 1788) in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 11, at 315, 319-20).
14. Id.
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which seldom or never err[ed] in making and applying laws to the
condition of the people."15 These, and other like concerns, led to
the jury-trial protections included in the Bill of Rights.16
As late as the early 1790s, the pre-Revolutionary
understanding of the jury's ultimate power to determine law as
well as fact persisted not only in state courts, but in the newly
established federal courts as well.1 7 The 1791 law lectures of
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, an eminent Federalist
thinker, constitute one prominent piece of evidence."
On the surface, Wilson was clear that judges determined law
and juries fact. In his words,
To a question of law the judges, not the jury, shall answer: so, to a
question of fact, the jury, not the judges, shall answer.' s

But, in many cases, the question of law is intimately and
inseparably blended with the question of fact: and when this is the
case, the decision of one necessarily involves the decision of the
other. When this is the case, it is incumbent on the judges to inform
the jury concerning the law; and it is incumbent on the jury to pay
much regard to the information, which they receive from the judges.
But now the difficulty, in this interesting subject, begins to press
upon us. Suppose that, after all the precautions taken to avoid it, a
difference of sentiment takes place between the judges and the jury,
with regard to a point of law: ... [Wihat must the jury do?-The
jury must do their duty, and their whole duty: they must decide the
law as well as the fact.20
Wilson understood that juries could make mistakes, even
"gross ones," but "their errors and mistakes can never grow into a
dangerous system." 2'
The "esprit du corps" existing among
judges,' who, as Richard Henry Lee had observed, possessed "an
involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity," 3
simply did not exist among juries, which could "not be bent under
the weight of precedent and authority.""
To prevent the
elaboration of judge-made law oppressive to the people, Wilson, in
15. Id.
16. See generally ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
1776-1791 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1983) (1955).

17. Id. at 100.
18. See generally 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (James DeWitt Andrews
ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (1895).
19. Id. at 194.
20. Id. at 219-20.
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id.

23. CORNELL, supra note 8, at 68 (quoting a Letter from Richard Henry Lee
to Edmund Pendelton (May 26, 1788)).
24. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 18, at 222.
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short, thought it necessary to defer to the lawmaking power of the
jury. 5
He was not alone. One year after Wilson's lectures, in the
28
Chief Justice John Jay
1794 case of Georgia v. Brailsford,
law as follows:
up
the
accepted
instructed a jury and summed
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on
questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it
must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right
to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law
as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other
occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay the respect, which
is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is
presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other
hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of law. But
27
still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision.
II. THE DESTABILIZATION OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW
Within the next decade, however, changes in national politics
completely destabilized Wilson's and Jay's statements of the law.
One change, which was nonpartisan, was dictated by the political
theory of the Revolution, as the 1792 South Carolina case of
Administratorsof Moore v. Cherry 8 illustrates.
The plaintiff in Moore was a Loyalist who brought suit to
recover a slave taken from him during the Revolutionary War by a
Patriot scouting party and then sold to the defendant.29 Ignoring
instructions that the plaintiff, pursuant to the 1783 peace treaty
with Great Britain and a statute passed by the South Carolina
legislature, was entitled to recovery of his slave, a jury found for
the defendant." After a new trial had been granted, a second jury
did the same.2 ' On appeal, the court granted yet a third trial, with
one judge declaring, "God forbid then that the verdicts of two
juries should make the law," since "[l]egislators as well as judges
would both then be useless;" and we "would be governed by such
rules as private opinion would occasionally dictate.""2
This language, I believe, shows a shift in the understanding of
what constituted "the Voice of the People"-the voice by which
juries had prevented pre-Revolutionary judges from imposing
25. Id. at 222-23.
26. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
27. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4.

28. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 269 (1792).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Moore, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271.
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oppressive law.3 As a result of the War for Independence, the
people had begun to speak instead through their sovereign
legislatures. Thus, allowing juries to determine law would not
merely prevent arbitrary judicial lawmaking; juries also would be
able to interpose their "private
opinion" in the path of legislation
34
reflecting the public's will.
The emerging understanding that the people spoke through
legislatures rather than juries had less of an impact, however,
than a second development of the 1790s--the emergence of
partisan conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonians.
The
assumption of the mid-eighteenth century had been that the
people, after consulting deferentially with their leaders, would
speak with a uniform voice.
That assumption lay at the
foundation of John Jay's and James Wilson's understandings of
the workings of the jury. Both thought that juries would listen
attentively and pay careful heed to judicial instructions before
returning their unanimous verdicts.3"
When national political divisions erupted in the mid-1790s, it
appeared to many that the common people had stopped listening
deferentially to their betters.36 Instead, the people seemed to set
out on paths of their own, often in opposition to what their betters
had directed them to do." In response, elites took steps to subject
the people to the control of the law. This effort to use law as a
vehicle to control the people, rather than to envision law as a
mechanism by which elites worked with their subordinates to
empower communities, emerges most clearly in the context of the
Sedition Act of 1798' and several prosecutions thereunder.
The Sedition Act sought to clamp down on popular turmoil.
The number of newspapers in the United States had expanded
rapidly during the 1790s, and most were politically aligned.' They
engaged in raucous political debate, harshly criticizing
government officials whom they opposed."
Moreover, their
criticism occurred at a time when the United States was
threatened with war and perhaps even foreign invasion.4' The
quantity and vehemence of critical political rhetoric, especially in

33. 1 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 4, at 229.
34. Moore, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 271.
35. See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 18, at 220.

36. See generally Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background, supra note
3, at 924-32.
37. Id.

38. An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled "An Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States," ch. 74, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
39. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 107-12 (Cornell Univ. Press 1963)
(1956).

40. Id.
41. See id. at 3-8.
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view of the high stakes, simply shocked the Federalists who
controlled Congress and led them to pass the 1798 Act making
seditious libel a federal crime.42
Of course, the Jeffersonian Republican opposition claimed
that the Sedition Act was an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment's clause protecting freedom of the press.43 Jefferson
and his main co-worker, James Madison, pursued their argument
of unconstitutionality in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798, in the presidential election of 1800 and in other political
Meanwhile, Jeffersonian editors who were indicted
forums."
under the Act raised the claim of unconstitutionality as a legal
defense to the government's proceedings."
Federalist judges who tried the proceedings were concerned
that juries might accept the defendants' arguments.46 If they did,
the Jeffersonian editors would be acquitted and the raucous
political debate legitimized. Thus, the Federalist judges began to
instruct juries that legal issues about the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act were solely for the courts; 7 they pulled away from
the formulation of Chief Justice Jay and Justice Wilson that only a
few years earlier had left issues of law to the jury.
The first to speak, although somewhat confusingly, was
Supreme Court Justice William Paterson while riding circuit in
Vermont in October 1798.' In a case arising out of an indictment
against a Republican Congressman, Matthew Lyon, who was also
a newspaper editor and frequent publisher of political tracts,
Justice Paterson directed the jury that it must treat the Sedition
Act as constitutional, unless and until it was "declared null and
void by a tribunal competent for the purpose"-namely, a court.49
Although the jury in this criminal case, by virtue of its capacity to
return a general verdict of not guilty, had power to ignore
Paterson's instruction, the Justice did not so inform the jury. ° He
certainly did not tell the jurors, as Chief Justice Jay had in
Brailsford, that they had a right to ignore his charge.5' On the
other hand, Paterson was not yet ready to restrict jury power in all

42. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 59099, 700-05 (1993); SMITH, supra note 39, at 95-96.
43. SMITH, supra note 39, at 96.
44. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 42
,at 721-26.

45. See id.
46. See FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 335-36 (Burt Franklin
ed., 1970) (1849).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 336.
Id. at 334-37.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Brailsford,3 U.S (3 Dali.) at 7-9.
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cases. Only a few days before his charge in the Lyon case,52 he had
told a different jury in a land confiscation case that both "courts
and juries were the proper bodies to decide on the constitutionality
of laws."53
Justice Samuel Chase took a more consistent position on
restricting juries while riding circuit in 1800 and trying two highly
publicized criminal cases. He began in late April, when he told a
grand jury in Pennsylvania that:
the Judges of the Supreme, and District Courts are bound by their
Oath of Office, to regulate their Decisions agreeably to the
Constitution. The Judicial power, therefore, are the only proper and
competent authority to decide whether any Law made by Congress;
or any of the State Legislatures is contrary to or in Violation of the
federal Constitution.5
He applied his view several days later during the treason trial
of John Fries, who had led an armed mob in a protest against
payment of a federal tax on windows.55
Fries had been tried and convicted for treason during the
previous term of court, but the conviction had been set aside for
procedural reasons and a new trial ordered.56 At the first trial,
counsel had argued the law to the jury, maintaining that mere
resistance to the collection of taxes did not amount to levying war
against the United States and thus did not constitute treason. 57 At
the retrial, however, it soon became clear that Justice Chase did
not plan to permit counsel to make that argument again.8
As the proceedings opened, Chase handed out three copies of
a written opinion-one to defense counsel, one to the prosecutor,
and one to the jury-containing his analysis of the law of treason. 9
Although Chase said he was "'willing and desirous' to hear
counsel's [argument] on the law," which could be presented "either
with the Jury or any other Way," he also indicated that "he would
not permit improper or irrelevant authorities" to be offered.' He

52. Cir. Ct., D. Vt., Oct. 7, 1798, in WHARTON, supra note 46, at 333.
53. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 236 n.24 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) (quoting the AURORA (Phila.), Nov.
9, 1798).
54. Id. at 412. See id. at 408-17 (explaining Samuel Chase's Charge to the
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, Apr. 12,

1800).
55. Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127).
56. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE
ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE 107 (1991).
57. See id. at 105-06.
58. Id. at 109-10.
59. Fries, 9 F. Cas. at 941.
60. PRESSER, supra note 56, at 111 (citing Testimony of Alexander Dallas
before United States Senate in the Impeachment of Samuel Chase, reported in
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believed it his duty "to guard the jury against erroneous
impressions respecting the laws of the land."6 As to his issuance
of a written ruling at the opening of trial, without even hearing
argument from counsel, he said:
[H]e valued it not. It was an opinion he adopted on great
Consideration it having been settled by the Judges... who still
continued in that opinion. If he could not make up an Opinion
without Argument on the general Principles of Law, he was not fit
to Sit there. All Judges of law did this.62
A month later, at the seditious libel prosecution of James T.
Callender in the circuit court in Richmond, Virginia, Justice Chase
again interrupted counsel and delivered a prepared opinion.'
When counsel for the defense rose to urge the jury that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional, Chase twice interrupted him
and finally ordered him to take his seat.' Chase then delivered
his opinion, which he called "the result of mature reflection,"65
upholding the Act's constitutionality as a matter of law, denying
the right of the jury to consider the issue, and refusing to allow
counsel to argue it.'
Chase began by admitting that the jury had "a right.., to
determine what the law is in the case before them." 7 But this
meant only that the jury should "compare the statute with the
facts proved, and then... decide whether the acts done are
prohibited by the law."' This power, according to Chase, "the jury
necessarily possesses, in order to enable them to decide on the
guilt or innocence of the person accused." 9
The power to fit the facts within the law was "a very different
thing," however, from the power "to determine that the statute
produced is no law."7" Chase could not conceive-could not
"possibly believe that [C]ongress intended [the Sedition Act] to
grant a right to a petit jury to declare a statute void."7' Indeed, he
found the claim for jury power "entirely novel" and "very absurd
and dangerous, in direct opposition to, and a breach of the

Fries,9 F. Cas. at 941).
61. Fries, 9 F. Cas. at 937.
62. PRESSER, supra note 57, at 110-11 (quoting a Letter from Richard

Peters to Timothy Pickering (Jan. 24, 1804)).
63. United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 253 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No.
14,709).
64. Id. at 252-53.
65. Id. at 253.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 255.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Callender,25 F. Cas. at 255.

71. Id.
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constitution.""
He explained, in language reminiscent of the
holding of the judges in Moore:
If this power be once admitted, petit jurors will be superior to the
national legislature, and its laws will be subject to their control....
The evident consequences of this right in juries will be, that a law of
congress will be in operation in one state and not in another. A law
to impose taxes will be obeyed in one state, and not in another,
unless force be employed to compel submission.... It appears to me
that the right now claimed has a direct tendency to dissolve the
union of the United States. 3
In contrast, the "decisions in the district or circuit courts of
the United States [would] be uniform, or they [would] become so
by the revision and correction of the supreme court."74
There is no question that Chase's preparation and delivery of
written opinions as soon as the issue of jury lawfinding power
arose was novel, and Jeffersonian Republicans, who were livid at
the practice, impeached Chase for engaging in it.75 But, as we are
about to see, Chase was not alone in taking this new approach.
III. SEIZING CONTROL OF THE LAW
A. James Kent and New York
In the spring of 1798, Governor John Jay of New York
appointed the then thirty-four year-old James Kent, a prot~g6 of
Alexander Hamilton, to a seat on the Supreme Court of the State
of New York." Upon his appointment, Kent found both the court
and the law chaotic. He found the decisions of the court were not
the product
of a mature consideration. It was evident that they were not the
fruit of that careful and laborious investigation which is essential to
the proper discharge of the judicial functions; and the authority they
might otherwise have claimed was greatly impaired by those
frequent differences in opinion that are the necessary result of
imperfect examination and study. It was seldom that the opinions
of the judges, even in the most important cases, were reduced to
writing, and as no reports were then published, and no records
preserved of the grounds on which their decisions were placed, the
cases were numerous in which they had no rules to direct, no

72. Id. at 257.
73. Id. at 256.
74. Id. at 257.
75. See 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 238-39 (1981).
76. MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D. 31-33 (William Kent ed.,

1898) [hereinafter KENT]; Letter from Moss Kent to James Kent (Feb. 25,
1798), in id. at 110-11.
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precedents to govern them."
As Kent himself wrote, "there were no reports or State
precedents. The opinions from the Bench were delivered ore tenus.
We had no law of our own, and nobody knew what it [i.e., the law]
was.""8 Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that juries
felt no compunction in ignoring what little guidance they received
on the law from the court.
Kent set out to give New York a coherent body of
jurisprudence. He decided that:
he would examine for himself every case not decided on the hearing;
and in such examination would not confine himself to the cases and
authorities cited on the argument, but would embrace in his
researches all the law justly applicable to the questions to be
determined; and that in each case he would embody the result of his
examination in a written opinion. Accordingly, at the second term
that followed his appointment, in his first meeting for consultation
with his brethren, and to their great astonishment, he produced a
written opinion in every case that had been reserved for decision;
and as these opinions were carefully prepared, were clear in style,
forcible in reasoning, and well sustained by a reference to
authorities, his brethren.., were in no condition to controvert and
oppose them.79
With his introduction of "a thorough examination of cases and
written opinions," Kent "acquired preponderating influence" on the
court. ° As he wrote about one typical early case, "I presented and
read my written opinion.., and they all gave up to me, and so I
read it in court as it stands.""
But it was not always that easy. As Kent wrote:
Many of the cases decided during the sixteen years I was in the
Supreme Court were labored by me most unmercifully, but it was
necessary under the circumstances, in order to subdue opposition.
We had but few American precedents.... English authority did not
stand very high in those early feverish times, and this led me a
hundred times to attempt to bear down opposition, or shame it by
exhaustive research and overwhelming
authority. Our jurisprudence
82
was, on the whole, improved by it.
Like Justice Chase, Kent understood the key fact that in a
legal system "governed by precedents, and customs, and
authorities, and maxims" binding on judge and jury alike,83
preparation of a written opinion reflecting thought and research
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

83. 2

at
at
at
at

112-13.
117.
113-14.
117.

at 118.

THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 18, at 223.
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would give a judicial author a comparative advantage over those of
his brethren who had not prepared their positions with equal
care.' As Kent explained, his turn to legal research and to the
preparation of written opinions "was the commencement of a new
plan[,] ... the first stone in the subsequently erected temple of our
jurisprudence."'
The next step was to assure authoritative publication of the
court's opinions. Kent obtained the services of his friend, William
Johnson, who began publishing and selling Johnson's Reports
commercially.' Soon Kent's concern that nobody knew what the
law was, that English precedents were poorly regarded, and that
New York precedent did not exist was alleviated. By the time
Kent was appointed chancellor of New York in 1814,87 the state's
law was fixed in precedent and well known to the practicing bar.
The final step in Kent's plan was to deprive the jury of its
power to find law and restrict it only to the facts. No clear
evidence exists of how this final step was accomplished, but it is
clear that by 1804, at the latest, the civil jury had been tamed. By
that year, the courts were routinely granting new trials in civil
cases where the jury had ignored the court's instructions.8 In the
same year, the Supreme Court also heard an appeal in People v.
Croswell,89 a seditious libel case in which the trial court had
instructed the jury that it had no power to determine the law. 9°
Pursuant to that instruction, the jury in Croswell returned a
verdict of guilty, which was affirmed by an equally divided court.9'
The legislature responded, however, with a statute authorizing the
jury to find law in criminal libel cases.9'
B. FederalJudicialReform and the 1801 JudiciaryAct
No one talked as explicitly as did Kent about the process by
which the judiciary seized control of the law from the jury. But
there was talk at the federal level about problems with the judicial

84. KENT, supra note 76, at 117.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 124-25.
87. See id. at 157.
88. See Mumford v. Smith, 1 Cai. R. 520, 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Jackson
v. Bowen, 1 Cai. R. 358, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803); Dow v. Smith, 1 Cai. R. 32,
36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).
89. 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). The case is analyzed in detail in
1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 775-867 (Julius Goebel Jr., ed., 1964) [hereinafter LAW
PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON].
90. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 363.
91. See 1 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 89, at 789,
843-44.
92. See id. at 846 n.124.
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system established by the Judiciary Act of 1789,"3 and there were
efforts, culminating in the Judiciary Act of 1801, 94 to fashion
reforms comparable to those of Kent. The 1801 Act, as we know,
was a failure,95 but those involved in its preliminary drafting
nonetheless imposed many of its reforms from the bench.
Dissatisfaction with having Supreme Court justices ride
circuit began to emerge as early as the mid-1790s.9 It was not
simply that circuit riding was tiring and unpleasant.97 The
problem "in more than one Instance [was] that Questions in the
Circuit Courts [that were] decided by one Set of Judges in the
affirmative, ha[d] afterwards... been decided by others in the
negative."" Typically, there was no way to bring these issues to
the full Supreme Court by writ of error, which, as the justices
themselves noted in a communication to Congress, "tend[ed] to
render the law unsettled and uncertain, and thereby create[d]
apprehension and diffidence in the public mind."'
According to Attorney General Edmund Randolph, the
"detaching of the judges to different circuits" deprived the Court of
"the benefit of an unprejudiced consultation" among the justices
and prevented "[tihe delivery of a solemn opinion in court [that]
commit[ted] them" to a permanent, reasoned view of the law. 00 In
short, James Kent's 1799 idea that judicial opinions should be the
product "of a mature consideration" and of "careful and laborious
investigation" by the bench as a whole and that "the authority" of
judge-made law "was greatly impaired by those frequent
differences in opinion that are the necessary result of imperfect
examination and study"' was beginning to take shape in
connection with the federal judiciary. Congress, however, was
busy with other matters, and no action was taken for several
years.
It was James Kent's mentor, Alexander Hamilton, who
pushed Congress into action when, in 1799, he presented a
proposal for judicial reform to Jonathan Dayton, the Speaker of

93. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
94. 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed by Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802)).

95. The 1801 Act was repealed by the Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 132
(1802).
96. See 2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 115.
97. For a discussion on the hardships of circuit riding, see id. at 114-15.
98. Id. at 115 (quoting a Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 19,

1793)).
99. Id. at 115-16 (quoting a Letter from the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States to the Congress of the
United States (Feb. 1794)).
100. Id. at 118 (quoting Edmund Randolf, JudiciarySystem, in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 23-24 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin,
eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1834)).
101. KENT, supra note 76, at 112.
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the House, and Theodore Sedgwick, who had served on the Senate
Judiciary Committee and was about to replace Dayton as
Speaker. 2 Other proposals for reconfiguring the federal judiciary
followed Hamilton's, and both houses of Congress promptly
appointed special committees to address them."3 John Marshall,
who had just been elected to Congress, was one of five members of
the House of Representatives committee.!"
Ultimately, the
Judiciary Act of 1801 emerged out of the committee's
deliberations.'0°
No record remains of the committee's discussions, but there is
reason to believe that, as the Federalist leaders of Congress
developed their specific legislative agenda leading up to the 1801
Act, they also matured their ideas of how a well-functioning
judicial system would operate. John Marshall, it should be noted,
remained a key player throughout.
He defended committee
proposals on the floor of the House in the spring of 1800, where he
"entered into a lengthy defence [sic] of the [proposed] new
system."" When he joined the Adams administration a few weeks
later as Secretary of State, he became an important advisor to the
1
President on judicial matters. 07
In that role, Marshall drafted
Adams' November 1800 message to Congress, 0 which urged
Congress to give "serious consideration" to "the Judiciary system
of the United States""9 and finally led to the passage of the Act of
1801.1"0
The 1801 Act, which never took effect because it was repealed
immediately by the Judiciary Act of 1802,"' contained a number of
provisions comparable to the reforms that James Kent had put
into operation in New York. The "most essential feature" of the
Act, according to John Marshall, was "the separation of the Judges
of the supreme from those of the circuit courts,""' a reform that
would have given the Supreme Court "the benefit of an
unprejudiced consultation" among the justices and enabled them
102. See Kathryn Turner, FederalistPolicy and the JudiciaryAct of 1801, 22
WM. & M.Q. (3d ser.) 3, 9-10, 22 (1965).
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 9-10, 22.
106. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 646 (1800).

107. Letter from John Marshall to John Adams (Nov. 17, 1800), in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 11 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990).

108. Id.
109. Id. at 12.

110. An Act to Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts
of the United States, ch. 4, § 31, 2 Stat. 89, 98 (1801).
111. An Act to Repeal Certain Acts Respecting the Organization of the

Courts of the United States; and for Other Purposes, ch. 8, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 132
(1802).

112. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Feb. 2, 1801), in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 107, at 65.
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to deliver "a solemn opinion in court commit[ting] them" to a
permanent, reasoned view of the law. 113 Two additional changes
would have given the judiciary greater control over juries.
The first of these changes expanded the power of circuit
judges to grant new trials. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
judges possessed "power to grant new trials ... for reasons for
which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law."1 4
Arguably, the power did not comprehend control over the
lawfinding authority of juries because, as of 1789, there was little
American judicial authority for granting new trials on the ground
that a jury had misapplied the law."' The 1801 Act broadened
judges' jurisdiction by "authoriz[ing] and empower[ing]" them "to
16
grant new trials and rehearings, on motion and cause shown."
The vagueness of this language necessarily broadened the scope of
new trial motions beyond the narrow confines authorized under
the 1789 Act.
The second additional change was in the scope of the writ of
error, the procedural device by which civil actions at law were
appealed from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court. 1 7 The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had contained a provision that no case could
be reversed on a writ of error "for any error in fact."1 8 The 1801
Act contained no such limitation on the Supreme Court's authority
to reverse a judgment below." 9
To the extent that the Judiciary Act of 1801 reflected the
thinking of the Congressional committee on which John Marshall
sat in the winter of 1799-1800,120 it appears that the committee
sought to achieve for the federal courts what James Kent had
begun to bring about in New York. Step one was the creation of a
113. 2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 118 (quoting Edmund
Randolf, Judiciary System, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS,

supra note 100, at 24).
114. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
§17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
115. Indeed, I know of only one case, Steinmetz v. Currey, 1 Dall. 234 (Pa.
1788). As of 1789, however, the reporter in which the case now appears had
not yet been published, and it seems unlikely that the case was widely known
to the members of Congress, who were much more likely to be familiar with
the then widely followed rule that juries had power to determine law as well
as fact.
116. An Act to Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts
of the United States, ch. 4, § 31, 2 Stat. at 98.
117. Id.

118. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
§22, 1 Stat. at 85.
119. See An Act to Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the
Courts of the United States, ch. 4, § 34, 2 Stat. at 99.
120. According to Marshall, the legislation proposed

in

1800

was

"substantially the same" as that enacted in 1801. Letter From John Marshall
to William Paterson (Feb. 2, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL,
supra note 107, at 65.
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Supreme Court with "the province and duty.., to say what the
law is." 121 Step two was the development of procedures internal to
12
the Court to facilitate the exercise of its "province and duty."
Step three was the transfer of lawfinding power, at least in civil
cases, from juries to judges."'
C. Theodore Sedgwick and Massachusetts
Theodore Sedgwick became a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and then Speaker of the House of Representatives
during the years leading up to the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1801.12'
An able lawyer, he undoubtedly participated in the
discussions among Federalists that led to the 1801 Act. Following
the Jeffersonian triumph in 1800, however, Sedgwick retired from
national politics and turned his attention to his own state,
Massachusetts. 2 1 Probably agreeing with Fisher Ames that the
Federalists might "need the state tribunals as sanctuaries when
Jacobinism comes to rob and slay," 16 he obtained an appointment
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court."'
Once on the court, Sedgwick emulated Kent's plan. First, he
sought a change in the court's practice of having all its judges ride
circuit together and resolve questions of law at the session in
which they arose."'
He proposed that judges ride circuit
individually to preside over trials and then assemble collectively at
special law terms, where a library would be available and the
court would have time to study the issues presented."
The
General Court enacted the necessary legislation in 1804-1805.13
The first volume of published Massachusetts Reports also appeared
at the same time."' The two developments quickly gave birth to a
body of decisional law for the Commonwealth.
Sedgwick also campaigned to put an end to the power of the
jury to determine law. As he argued:
In all instances where trial by jury has been practiced, and a
separation of the law from the fact has taken place, there have been
expedition, certainty, system and their consequences, general
121. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 42, at 728.
125. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND
POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 187-88 (1971).

126. Id. at 188 (quoting a Letter from Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore (Feb.
24, 1803), in 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 321 (Seth Ames ed. Boston 1854)).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 189.
129. Id. at 188-91.
130. Id. at 191.
131. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at
168.
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approbation. Where this has not been the case, neither expedition,
certainty nor system have prevailed. 32
An emerging class of entrepreneurs, who needed to plan their
investment strategies, agreed.
Businesses were disturbed at
having their rights and liabilities determined by "the fluctuating
estimates of juries " "' whose "utterly indefinite and uncertain"
behavior provided investors with "no rule for their future
conduct."'34 Counsel accordingly argued "that juries ought by the
court to be restrained and kept within the proper and established
rules.""5 By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century,
the verdicts of Massachusetts juries were being set aside routinely
when they were contrary to law or to the evidence.'36
D. The FederalistProgramin Other States
The Federalist plan for seizing control of the law from the lay
public and placing it in the hands of legal professionals was
carried out from state to state in the early years of the nineteenth
century. Another leading Federalist was Jeremiah Smith, whom
President John Adams had appointed as the midnight circuit
judge for New Hampshire. 7 When it became clear that Smith
would not serve on the federal bench, he instead became Chief
Judge of New Hampshire in 1802,18 where he set about
professionalizing the law of his own state.
His first step was to end the practice of having two or more
judges preside over trials on circuit, where with some frequency
they would give conflicting instructions to juries and thereby leave
juries "free to reach verdicts on personal considerations, such as
their dislike of one of the parties or their feeling for what was
fair."'39 His second step, in 1806, was to assert the court's power to
set aside jury verdicts that were contrary to law or evidence,
thereby giving the court "the whole control of the case" and
making it "effectually ...judge and jury in the trial." "' Of course,
the implicit element of his plan was to have issues of law resolved
132. ELLIS, supra note 125, at 190.
133. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 165

(quoting Cogswell v. Essex Mill Corp., 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 94, 96 (1827)
(argument of counsel)).
134. Id. (quoting Gay v. Whiting, Norfolk County Court of Common Pleas
(Dec. 1810)).
135. Id. (quoting Wait v. M'Neil, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 261, 262 (1811) (argument
of counsel)).
136. See id. at 168-69.
137. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN
EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 59-60).

138. Id. (manuscript at 61).
139. Id. (manuscript at 108). See generally id. (manuscript at 107-17).
140. Id. (manuscript at 116) (quoting Law and Evidence, N.H. GAZETTE, Oct.
13, 1807, col. 3). See generally id. (manuscript at 115-30).
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by the full court meeting in law terms.
Even the capstone of the plan-professional legal
education-took off during the first decade of the nineteenth
century, when Tapping Reeve, a Federalist judge on the
Connecticut Supreme Court, transformed his law school at
Litchfield into a national institution designed to train future
leaders of the profession not only for New England but for the
nation as a whole.'
Reeve and his associate, James Gould, used
their school "to forward a Federalist conception of the proper role
of law in society and the proper organization of society more
generally."'
In particular, they understood that "[t]he laws of a
given society [were] not the arbitrary determinations.., of people,
but an expression of a 'permanent, uniform and universal' code.""
Along with other Federalists, Reeve and Gould transformed law
from a community enterprise of ordinary men into a rigorous
intellectual discipline for trained professionals.
The Federalists, of course, did not dominate politics in every
state. Where they did not control, Jeffersonians determined the
course of judicial reform. In Kentucky, for example, where radical
Jeffersonians controlled the state legislature, the opposite of the
Federalist platform was enacted: the judiciary was decentralized
and deprofessionalized.'" Each county was given a circuit court,
consisting of one legally trained circuit judge and two lay
assistants who could and often did outvote him, and the circuit
judges were given little opportunity to communicate with each
other so as to maintain legal uniformity. This system remained in
place for fifteen years following its adoption in 1801.45
A radical Jeffersonian majority in the state legislature also
stymied Federalist efforts in Pennsylvania. The radicals found
"lawyers law" 46 and the legal profession "a subject of the most
serious concern."' 47 They continued:
[Tihe loose principles of persons of that profession; their practice of
defending right and wrong indifferently, for reward; their open
enmity to the principles of free government, because free

141. See Andrew M. Siegel, "To Learn and Make Respectable Hereafter"-The
Litchfield Law School in Cultural Context, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1978, 2003
(1998).
142. Id. at 2012.
143. Id. at 2014.
144. See ELLIS, supra note 125, at 150.
145. See id. at 152-56.
146. Id. at 176 (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 1004

(Philip S. Foner ed., 1945)).
147. Id. at 177 (quoting JESSE HIGGINS, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES,
OR THE REFORMATION OF LAWSUITS; AND JUSTICE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY, AND
BROUGHT HOME TO EVERY MAN'S DOOR; AGREEABLY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE ANCIENT TRIAL BY JURY, BEFORE THE SAME WAS INNOVATED BY JUDGES

AND LAWYERS iv, 12 (Phila., 2d ed. 1805)).
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government is irreconcilable to the abuses upon which they thrive;
the tyranny which they display in the courts; and in too many cases
the too obvious understanding and collusion which prevails among
the members of the bench, the bar, and the officers of the court,
demand the most serious
interference of the legislature, and the
48
jealousy of the people.
In 1805, however, a coalition of moderate Jeffersonians and
4
Federalists won the governorship and control of the legislature 1
and promptly enacted a judiciary law, modeled on the federal
Judiciary Act of 1801.150
The 1806 Pennsylvania legislation
increased the number of trial courts, limited the original
jurisdiction of the state's Supreme Court and required the
appellate court to meet annually in Pittsburgh and twice a year in
Philadelphia in order to "ensure greater uniformity of decisions
among the lower courts."'5 1 During this time, judicial decisions
were already being published, and a Federalist, William
Tilghman, was appointed Chief Justice of the state's highest
52
court.
In his first year on the bench, Tilghman upheld the power of
the court to grant a new trial in instances when the jury had
decided against the law and the weight of the evidence." 3 Even
counsel arguing in favor of upholding a verdict conceded that
"[wlhen juries assume upon themselves to decide against the
known law, they become as dangerous as any set of tyrants, and
all certainty and security in the administration of justice are
banished from society, unless the judges interpose their summary
powers."'54 Tilghman remained Chief Justice for the next twentyone years, over the course of which he consolidated the various
changes instituted after the 1805 election.'55
Unfortunately, without significant archival research, the
picture of change is hazy in the most important state, Virginia.
We do know that between 1787 and 1809, county courts, which
were a carryover from the colonial era and which continued to be
staffed by lay judges, were gradually superceded by district and
later superior courts, the judges of which were professional

148. Id.
149. See id. at 180-81.
150. Id. at 182.
151. ELLIS, supra note 125, at 182. See generally id. at 171-83.
152. Id. at 183.
153. See Swearingen v. Birch, 4 Yeates 322, 325 (Pa. 1806). At least one
earlier case had upheld the granting of a new trial when a verdict was
contrary to law and evidence, Steinmetz v. Currey, 1 Dall. 234 (Pa. 1788), and
another upheld the court's power in dictum. See Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 55 (1796).
154. Swearingen, 4 Yeates at 322.
155. See ELLIS, supra note 125, at 183.

20041

The Province of the Judiciary

56
lawyers."
Legislation also established a Supreme Court of
Appeals, which could hammer out statewide solutions to the legal
issues that professional judges confronted on circuit.'57
We also know that James Callender's distinguished Virginia
attorneys-William Wirt, George Hay and Phillip Nicholasargued that Virginia law gave juries the power to find both law
and fact.'
Finally, we know that an 1811 anti-lawyer tract
proposed, among other things, that "jury trials be restored to a
place of eminence.""9 All this led the leading scholar of postRevolutionary Virginia law to conclude that the "basic function of
law in the commonwealth had changed. Law, as opposed to
antiquated notions of country justice, existed to enforce statutory
prescriptions, to execute speedy and efficient decisions on debt
[collection], and to prosecute serious criminals."1 6 By 1810, if not
before, the old "idea that law ought to be concerned with
investigating and enforcing the moral standards of a local
community whose interests were homogeneous and whose
overseers were the gentlemen justices of Virginia" was nothing but
a hope of a dissident minority of radical Republicans."'
Developments in Virginia thus appear parallel to those in the
North, but considerable archival research is needed to know for
sure. Similar research is required to know, even vaguely, what
occurred in many other states. What is clear is that in the first
decade of the nineteenth century, the Federalists, with the support
of the business community and with help, when needed, from
moderate Jeffersonians, put the program of judicial reform
elaborated most explicitly by James Kent into place in every major
coastal state north of the Mason-Dixon Line. Issues of law were
reserved for state appellate courts, which began to resolve those
issues with a single voice and to publish their opinions. Juries
were deprived of the power to find law in civil cases.'62 The law
came to be seen as a profession, for which all members required
training and the leaders of which-the judges-should be drawn
from among those with the highest professional attainments.

E. John Marshalland the Provinceof the FederalJudiciary
Where was John Marshall in this process?

The answer, it

156. See A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAwYERS:
CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 201-07, 249 (1981).
157. Id.

158. See PRESSER, supra note 56, at 136-37.
159. ROEBER, supra note 156, at 242-43.
160. Id. at 216.
161. Id.
162. That power persisted in criminal cases, however, well into the
nineteenth century. See generally Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of
Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1938).
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appears, is that Marshall was in the very center of things. He was
a member of the Congressional committee that drafted the
predecessor to the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the defender of that
predecessor legislation on the House floor. He corresponded with
Alexander Hamilton, who was James Kent's mentor, while the
presidential election of 1800 was pending in the House.1u At the
time, Marshall was Adams's Secretary of State; as such, he had
significant contact with Theodore Sedgwick, then Speaker of the
House."' Finally, Jeremiah Smith, who would lead the effort in
New Hampshire to obtain professional control over the law,
lobbied John Marshall, by letter and through Fisher Ames and the
Essex Junto, for a judicial appointment in the waning days of the
Adams administration and thanked Marshall by letter when he
received one.16
Thus, it is not surprising that once John Marshall became
Chief Justice of the United States, he did what he could to put the
Federalist program into place. He took a first step in the spring of
1802, after Congress had repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 and
restored the older circuit-riding duties of the justices. 6 6 The
justices then had to decide whether to obey Congress'
command--"a subject," in Marshall's words, "not to be lightly
resolved on."'67
"The burthen of deciding so momentous a
question.., would be very great on all the Judges assembled: but
an individual Judge... must sink under it.""
Marshall
accordingly proposed that the justices communicate with each
other by letter, act collectively if they could reach agreement on
whether or not to reassume circuit duties and meet in Washington
if they could not. 66
With the immediate crisis resolved after 1803, Marshall
instituted more permanent practices to ensure the Court's
collegiality and cooperation. He arranged, for example, to have all
the justices board and dine together in the same hotel or inn.76
There they engaged constantly in the discussion of pending
163. See Letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 1, 1801), in
6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 107, at 46.
164. See Letter from John Marshall to Theodore Sedgwick (Feb. 27, 1801), in
6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 107, at 85.
165. REID, supra note 137 (manuscript at 71-81).
166. See 2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 170; NELSON, supra note
7, at 68-69.
167. 2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 170 (quoting a Letter from

John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802)).
168. Id. at 172 n. 182 (quoting a Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall
(Apr. 24, 1802)).
169. See id. at 170-71 (quoting a Letter from John Marshall to William
Paterson (May 3, 1802)).
170. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 31 (Del
Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE]. See also 2
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 85.
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matters in order to come to a consensus. As Marshall wrote in
turning down a dinner invitation, "I cannot absent myself from our
daily consultation without interrupting the course of the
business."1 '
Marshall also abolished seriatim opinions by
Supreme Court justices and instituted the practice of having the
Court formulate a single opinion in private and then issue it as the
opinion of all. 72
Until 1812, Marshall, as Chief Justice, or
whatever justice was presiding in his absence, "almost invariably3
announced the opinion of the Court, whether or not he wrote" it.'
Marshall also discouraged dissents because he appreciated how
"the habit of delivering dissenting opinions ... weaken [ed] the
authority of the Court, and [was] of no public benefit."1 4 William
Johnson, the first Jeffersonian appointed to the Court, delivered
his first dissent and
during the rest of the session... heard nothing but lectures on the
indecency of judges cutting at each other, and the loss of reputation
which the Virginia appellate court had sustained by pursuing such a
course, etc. At length I found I must either submit.., or become a
cypher in our consultations
as to effect no good at all. I therefore
75
bent to the current.
Even when the majority of the Court disagreed with a point
made in a Marshall opinion, it suppressed its disagreement. And,
Marshall, in turn, wrote and delivered opinions with which he did
not fully agree, and he almost never dissented, doing so only eight
times and just once in a constitutional case during his thirty-four
years on the bench. 7 ' Marshall, as well as anyone, knew that in
order to give law the intellectual respectability and political power
he wanted it to have, the Supreme Court had to work together
to
77
formulate rules on which all could place their imprimatur.
Like other Federalists, John Marshall also was vigorously
protecting private property rights, as evidenced by his dictum in
Marbury assimilating office holding to property and declaring that
the President had no power to deprive a man of property7 and by
later holdings in cases like Fletcher v. Peck'79 and Trustees of

171. SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 170, at 33 n.36 (quoting a
Letter from John Marshall to John Randolph (Mar. 4, 1816), in 6 THE PAPERS
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 107, at 127).
172. See 2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 105.
173. SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 170, at 34.
174. Id. at 34 (quoting a Letter from Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (1818)).
175. Id. at 35 (quoting a Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson
(Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 189 (1988)).
176. See id.

177. See id. at 31-32.
178. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 60.
179. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward.8 ' And, about the same time that
he wrote in Marbury that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," 8' he put
his language into practice by asserting the judiciary's power to
take issues of law away from civil juries.
Four cases that Marshall heard while riding circuit, covering
the time span from December 1802 (two months before Marbury)
to December 1803 (ten months after Marbury), need to be
analyzed. Unfortunately, the records remaining from the cases
are incomplete and less than fully lucid; hence conflicting
interpretations are possible. However, together the four cases
establish that Chief Justice Marshall was prepared to set aside
verdicts if the jury in a civil case misapplied the law or considered
inappropriate evidence.
The case from December 1802 was Stone v. Reeves."' The
record establishes that the defendant moved for a new trial and
that the circuit court granted the motion." It is also clear that the
ground for the motion was a statement made by one of the jurors
that the jury had erred in estimating damages." The jury had
assumed erroneously that if tobacco had been sold in a certain
time, place, and manner, it would have brought a certain price,
and it based its verdict on the difference between that assumed
price and the actual price at which the tobacco was sold.' What is
unclear is whether the jury's error was one of law or fact: that is,
whether the jury had made a legal error in assuming that the
tobacco should have been sold in the time, place, and manner it
identified, or whether the jury had made a factual error as to the
price it would have brought then and there. The file papers
contain no testimony or depositions about tobacco prices at the
time, place, and manner in question, which points to a conclusion
that the issue on which the jury erred was one of law rather than
fact. If so, error of law was the ground for which a new trial was
granted, but it is impossible to be sure.
The second case, Sanders v. Hamilton," is somewhat clearer.
In the first trial, which was a suit for damages in connection with
the recovery of slaves, Marshall ruled that a particular item of
evidence could come in only for a limited purpose,'87 following
which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff-a verdict that

180. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
181. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
182. Cir. Ct., D. Va., Dec. 4, 1802 (on record with the Library of Va.,

Richmond, Va.).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 21 F. Cas. 320 (C.C.D. N.C. 1802) (No. 12,294).
187. Sanders, 21 F. Cas. 321.
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Marshall thereupon set aside." It is possible that the court set
the verdict aside and granted a new trial because the jury had
misused the evidence, but the report of the case makes this
possibility unlikely. Instead, the report of the second trial in the
case"'9 suggests that the jury, after resolving the substantive issue,
also assessed damages and did so on a wrong theory of law. 9 ° "The
question was whether the jury should assess the damages
according to the value of the slaves at the time Streeter recovered
them against Sanders or at their present value , ". 9 and Marshall
declared that "[tihe jury should assess damages according to the
value at the time of recovery." 9' Thus, I read Sanders as a case
where Marshall set aside a jury verdict resting on a wrong theory
of law, although it is not clear that the jury had ignored
instructions in arriving at its verdict.
The issue in the third case, Owen v. Adams,"' was one of
evidence. The suit was brought on a merchant's book account,
The
which was proved by an exact copy of the account book.'
standard rule of evidence, however, also required that the clerk
who had made the entry testify to its making or, if the clerk was
dead, as was the case in Owen, that someone attest to the clerk's
handwriting.9 ' There was no such attestation.'9
Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict directing that the
merchant recover the account,1 97 although it is not certain whether
the jury ignored instructions in so doing. In granting a new trial,
Marshall wrote:
I... was at first disposd [sic] ... to permit the present verdict to
stand, altho [sic] directly against my own opinion. But upon
reflection I think myself obliged to change that opinion [and] to set
aside this verdict. I feel no doubts concerning the law of the case. I
have no doubts but that the amount of a debt can only be
established by testimony which is in itself legal[.] ... I think it of the
most dangerous tendency to admit such evidence, [and] as there is a
difference between decisions which meerly [sic] respect the rules of
evidence [and] those which affect rights; [and] also between a single
decision subject to revision, [and] a series of decisions which may be
considerd [sic] as fixing the law of the land; and as it is in my
opinion of much importance that exact uniformity should be

188. See 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 107, at 145 n.2.
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190. Id.
191. Id. at 190 n.1.
192. Id. at 190.
193. Cir. Ct., D. Va., Dec. 7, 1803, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL,
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194. Id. at 206-07.
195. Id. at 207.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 206 n.1.
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observed in decisions on that testimony which will be requird [sic]
by the court in order to support a claim on account, which is best to
be obtaind [sic] by an inflexible observance of the rules established
by law, [and] not by deviating occasionally from them on
circumstances perpetually varying in slight unimportant degrees; I
think it right to adhere to the safe [and] well understood rules of the
common law [and] shall therefore direct a new trial in this case.9
Although Owen arose on a point of evidence rather than
because a jury had ignored instructions on the law, the concerns
stated by Marshall were almost identical to those stated by other
judges who set aside verdicts after juries had ignored instructions.
Thus, Owen and those cases are functionally, though not precisely,
the same.
The fourth case, Flemming & Co. v. Murfree,99 also involved
an issue of evidence with strong substantive overtones. The issue
was whether the plaintiff had sued to recover a debt within the
proper limitation period. °° He clearly had not done so, unless an
acknowledgment of the debt by the administrators of the debtor
had extended the period. 0 1 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff creditor, but that verdict was recorded "subject to the
Court's opinion on the right of the plaintiff to give in evidence an
acknowledgment of the debt by the administrator so as to avoid
statute of limitations." 2° A few days later, following argument on
the motion, Chief Justice Marshall set the verdict aside and
granted a new trial."' Again, the case is functionally equivalent to
cases granting new trials when juries ignore instructions, in that
it "emphatically [asserted] the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 2" But it did so in a context
involving the admissibility of evidence, not instructions, and a
context in which the mistake on the first trial may have been that
of the court, not the jury.
Marshall, however, seems to have thought the similarities
were more important than the differences. In January 1805, in a
letter to Justice Samuel Chase, Marshall simply took for granted
the propriety of granting a new trial for "a jury finding a verdict
against the law of the case,"2 5 and in a published 1811 opinion,
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Letcher v. Woodson,2 °" he explicitly stated that should "a jury...
find a verdict against law," the court had power to "set it aside and
award a new trial." °7
In short, John Marshall, who was part of a network of
Federalist judges that included James Kent, Tapping Reeve,
Theodore Sedgwick and Jeremiah Smith, took essentially the same
actions they took to make it "emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is."2" He abolished
seriatim opinions, insisted that courts render collective judgments
reflecting the opinion of the court as a whole, suppressed dissent,
strove to develop law through lines of precedent and set aside jury
verdicts inconsistent with judge-made law in civil cases. Marshall
left no papers, as Kent did, which establish that his actions were
part of a coherent political plan to defeat the aspirations of radical
Jeffersonians to further democratize American law. But, in light
of those with whom he worked and of the origins of their program
in reform discussions in which Marshall participated as a
Congressman, it is plausible to conclude that he acted in response
to those discussions.
IV.MARBURY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE PROVINCE OF JUDGES

In fitting the early nineteenth century's transfer of lawfinding
power from civil juries to judges into the larger configuration of
John Marshall's jurisprudence, we must be careful to avoid
anachronistic thinking. Marshall grew up, learned to think about
the law and participated in the political battles of the eighteenth
century. When he ascended the bench, he had no idea what the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries would bring. He was not the
Chief Justice of a Supreme Court that had already decided Brown
v. Board of Education"° and Roe v. Wade, 1' or the tenth Justice
sitting in Bush v. Gore. " ' The most important case decided by the
Court to which John Marshall was appointed probably was
Chisholm v. Georgia,"' precisely because it had been overturned
by a constitutional amendment."'
I have argued in my book on Marbury.. that Marshall
to instructions by the court. If we see "verdicts contrary to instructions" as
merely one subset of the broader category of "verdict[s] against the law of the
case," then Marshall's behavior was totally analogous to that of northern state
judges like Kent, Sedgwick and Smith. Id.
206. 15 F. Cas. 401 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1811) (No. 8,280).
207. Letcher, 15 F. Cas. at 403.
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understood and was sympathetic to the workings of American
democracy.215 Throughout the 1790s and during the election of
1800, he was a political moderate who strove to build consensus.216
In the context of this Article, it is also necessary to understand
how Marshall thought juries functioned in the eighteenth century.
Marshall never wrote about this topic, but with a little historical
imagination, we can reconstruct what he probably understood.
Eighteenth-century juries, as we have already seen, were a
democratic force that "secure[d] to the people at large, their just
and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial department."1 7 But they
were not an unbridled force. As James Wilson observed, it was
"incumbent on the judges to inform the jury concerning the law;
and it [was] incumbent on the jury to pay much regard to the
information, which they receive[d] from the judges."" 8 Most of the
time, it appears that democratic juries did, in fact, pay heed and
give deference to the fixed principles of law of which the judges
informed them.219 Democracy and the rule of law thus functioned
in tandem to govern Great Britain's North American colonies, as, I
suspect, John Marshall well understood.
The War of Independence significantly reshaped American
politics, however, by introducing a new political style in stark
contrast to the mid-eighteenth-century style.
First, the
Continental Congress and later, the Confederation Congress had
to resolve issues of war and peace, to place national power on a
firm constitutional footing and to govern the trans-Appalachian
territories acquired from Great Britain in the 1783 peace treaty
acknowledging American independence.
In performing these
tasks, Congress and other national officials had to make choices
among possible policies that were in conflict with each
other-choices that favored some American interests over others
and thus could not be made on the basis of principles or values
with which nearly everyone agreed.2 °
These national issues impacted local politics.22'
One
important issue throughout the 1780s and 1790s, for example,
concerned the right of former Loyalists to recover lands and
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debts-a right guaranteed by the treaty of 1783. Several states,
however, refused to honor the treaty and placed various
impediments in the path of the Loyalists. The British government
responded by refusing to evacuate outposts in the western portions
of the United States, while prospective lenders in Great Britain,
fearing that they would face future impediments as creditors,
reacted by tightening credit. As a result, Americans seeking to
borrow money found it more difficult and expensive to do so, and
those seeking to settle or otherwise exploit the West found the
British army and its Indian allies in their path. Of course, they
came into conflict with those who had procured the state
legislation that had upset Britain and thereby generated their
problems.222
The revolutionary
struggle and the attainment of
independence also transformed American society and politics
ideologically. In discarding British rule and reconstituting their
governments, Americans proclaimed that all law springs from the
popular will as codified in legislation.222 If the people could remake
their government, it followed that lawmaking power, in general,
224
must be "original, inherent, and unlimited by human authority."
A preacher who spoke to the Massachusetts legislature in 17825
identified popular will as "the only rational source of power,,1
while in the next year, the Connecticut Courant wrote that there
was "an original, underived and incommunicable authority and
supremacy in the collective body of the people, to whom all
delegated power must submit, and from whom there is no
appeal."22' This concept of legislation as the creation of new law by
the people proved practically significant as groups like religious
dissenters used it to promote their interests."?
This transformation occurred, however, in a society
unprepared to abandon blithely the pre-Revolutionary ideal that
human law must conform to fundamental principles of divine or
natural law. Post-Revolutionary Americans continued to maintain
that they could rationally "define the rights of nature" and learn
"how to search into, to distinguish, and to comprehend, the
222. See id. at 30-31.
223. Id. at 32.
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principles of physical, moral, religious, and civil liberty."2 8
Believing, like Alexander Hamilton, in "eternal principles of social
justice,"2 9 Americans in the mid-1780s objected to legislation
"founded not upon the principles of Justice, but upon the Right of
the Sword" and for which "no other Reason [could] be given...
than because the Legislature had the Power and Will to enact such
a Law."22 According to a 1786 article in the Providence Gazette,
legislators who enacted laws that "violate[d] .. . fundamental
principles ...[were] substituting power for right.""' Thinkers like
James Madison, arguing at the time of the Constitutional
Convention for a congressional power to negate state legislation,
accordingly noted in a letter to George Washington that America
needed "some disinterested [and] dispassionate umpire [to control]
disputes between different passions [and] interests in the
State[s]."
Madison, among others, hoped that the new federal
government could be the umpire, but as the 1790s progressed, it
became clear it could not. On the contrary, by creating national
political institutions, the Constitution of 1787 led to the flowering
of national political strife as different groups struggled to control
new federal political entities. The Constitution simply transferred
democratic political pressure from the state to the national level.
By the mid-1790s, two national political groups-the
Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans-had emerged in
response to the French Revolution and the signing of Jay's Treaty
with Great Britain.2 ' The two groups had ideological differences
as well. "For example, the Federalists saw in Jefferson and the
Republicans many of the threats to religion, life, and property that
they found so horrifying in French revolutionaries." 4 Thus, the
election of 1800, according to one Federalist campaign tract, would
require voters to select either "GOD-AND A RELIGIOUS
PRESIDENT; or impiously declare for JEFFERSON-AND NO
GOD!!!" 235 Federalists feared that if "the restraints of religion
228. William Pierce, An Oration, Delivered at Christ Church, Savannah, on
the 4th July, 1788, in Commemoration of the Anniversary of American
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[were] once broken down, as they infallibly would be, by leaving
the subject of public worship to the humors of the multitude,...
we might well defy all human wisdom and power, to support and
preserve order and government in the State[s] ."36
If the Federalists were convinced that conferral of power upon
Republicans would subvert morality and lead to violence and
anarchy, the Republicans were equally convinced that, if allowed
to retain power, the Federalists would subvert republican liberties
and rule autocratically.
The Alien and Sedition Acts, the
imposition of a direct tax and the establishment of a standing
army during the administration of President John Adams only
confirmed these fears.237
In short, partisan divisions had emerged by the second half of
the 1790s. On one side stood the Republicans, avowing, in the
words of James Madison, "the doctrine that mankind are capable
of governing themselves,"2" and accused by their opponents of
scheming "to introduce a new order of things as it respects morals
and politics, social and civil duties."2 9 Opposite them stood the
Federalists, claiming to preserve "that virtue [which] is the only
permanent basis of a [Rlepublic," 240 and accused of attempting to
restore a monarchical government.
When Thomas Jefferson and his party won the election of
1800, it became clear to the Federalists that they could not protect
fixed and fundamental principles of law and justice from the
whims and humors of the democratic multitude through control of
the executive and legislative branches of the national government.
The Federalists' next effort, through the Judiciary Act of 1801,
was to create a robust national judiciary as a bulwark against the
masses. But when the Jeffersonian Congress repealed the 1801
Act and the Supreme Court, in Stuart v. Laird,24' sustained the
constitutionality of the repeal, 42 that effort also failed. Dictum in
Marbury said, and Stuart held, that the Supreme Court would not
overturn a considered policy judgment of the democratically
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chosen Congress of the United States.243
This led the Federalists to their final line of defenseprofessionalization-the claim that law, an accumulation of fixed
and fundamental rules and practices originating in the past, could
be apprehended only by the research and analysis of trained
individuals, namely lawyers and judges. Law was not something
that lay people could intuit on a day-to-day basis as they sat on
juries and decided cases by reference to their personal policy
preferences. Only by making law the province of professional
lawyers and ultimately of the judiciary could the tyranny of the
mob be prevented and the certainty and stability needed for
economic growth be maintained.
Thus, the Jeffersonians were right when they accused the
Federalists of striving "to exalt the Judiciary ... and to give that
But
favorite department a political character [and] influence."2
the exaltation of the judiciary did not obliterate the power of
democracy. It may have become "the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," 24 5 but it remained
within the power and the right of the legislative department to
change the law the judiciary declared. And, if the people mobilized
themselves in support of the change, Marbury said and Stuart
held, that the change would be understood as political rather than
legal and hence beyond the Supreme Court's power of judicial
John Marshall's limited version of judicial review
review.2
allowed professionals to seize control over the substance of the law
only to the extent that the people, through democratic political
processes, did not object.
The power of professionals also was restricted in another
respect. To announce that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 4 7 did not
mean that judges could make the law anything they wanted it to
be, either in a jury instruction or in a constitutional decision.
Kent, Sedgwick and others understood that their power to speak
the law rested on their superior ability to research traditional
professional sources and thereby find preexisting law. They, along
with John Marshall, did not claim, and they knew they had no
basis for claiming, that anyone other than the people had power
"to establish . . . such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness. " "
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In conclusion, it is important to understand that the changes
I have been discussing-the professionalization of law and the
development of judicial review--did not make the judiciary
sovereign. The changes merely restored the ancient balance
between the fixed and fundamental principles of law and the
power of the people. With a little imagination, we can see that the
eighteenth-century American legal order was simultaneously
anchored in unchanging principles and subject to democratic
control: local elites sitting as judges typically would guide their
fellow subjects in apprehending preexisting law, but ultimately
those subjects sitting as jurors would determine whether they
would follow that law. Certainty and stability were preserved
because the people typically accepted elite guidance, and life
accordingly went on largely as it always had, but ultimately the
people could make changes if they wanted. As a result, both elite
leaders and the common people felt comfortable that they were in
control.
Under the system adopted in the early nineteenth century,
judicially administered common law became a default norm that
civil juries could not surmount. Certainty and stability thus were
preserved, and elites routinely remained in a position to guide the
direction of society. But the people could change law through
politics if they organized and made the necessary effort to change
it, and the narrow doctrine of judicial review proclaimed in
Marbury gave judges virtually no power to resist once the people
had made up their minds. Something akin to the balance of the
eighteenth century thus was restored.
The limited nature of Marbury's vision of judicial review, it
might even be said, made professionalization possible. The seizure
of law from juries and its transformation into a matter for
professional elaboration and control would have been profoundly
antidemocratic if Chief Justice Marshall had not conceded "[that
the people have an original right" to choose what they want for
their law.249 If John Marshall had treated the Constitution as
embodying the policy choices he thought proper and thereby
barred legislatures from adopting different choices, his imposition
of control over juries would have deprived the people of all
lawmaking capacity. It is impossible to imagine that the people
and their Jeffersonian servants in Washington, in the aftermath of
the election of 1800, would have accepted such a deprivation.
Marshall, however, did not deprive the people of their sovereign
lawmaking power. On the contrary, he reassured them that they
could exercise their power in Congress and state legislatures. His
reassurance made it possible for the professionalizers to tell them
that they no longer could exercise lawmaking power as jurors.
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In short, Chief Justice John Marshall did not mount an attack
on democracy, and Marbury did not assume for the Supreme Court
the role of choosing the social policies that would govern America.
Choosing the policies that would "most conduce to their own
happiness " ' ° remained within the power of the people. Thus,
Marbury is not important because it made the Marshall Court
supreme; it did not. Marbury is important because it was one part
of a larger process of constitutional development that directed the
people to exercise their sovereign lawmaking power through
centralized legislative institutions, like Congress, rather than
through local entities like juries.
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